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DO WE EVEN NEED A TEST?
A REEVALUATION OF ASSESSING
SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN A
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CASE
Nicole K. Roodhuyzen *
INTRODUCTION
The task of proving that one creative work is similar enough
to another creative work so as to constitute copyright
infringement may be even more difficult than creating the work
in the first place. The improper appropriation 1 analysis, for both
courts and litigants, is one of the most contentious and least
precisely defined inquires in copyright law. 2 There are multiple
*
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1
“Improper appropriation” in this context refers to copying prohibited
by §§ 106(1) and 106(2) of the Copyright Act. Courts often use this
terminology when assessing claims for infringement of the reproduction right,
§ 106(1) and the derivative work right, § 106(2). In a two-part inquiry,
courts will first consider whether the defendant copied-in-fact or “copied” the
plaintiff’s work. They will then assess whether the defendant also engaged in
“improper appropriation” or “infringing copying” in violation of, for
example, § 106(1). See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL
INFORMATION ECONOMY 323 (2nd ed. 2006).
2
CRAIG JOYCE, MARSHALL LEAFFER, PETER JASZI & TYLER T. OCHOA,
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tests for copyright infringement and the analysis is often
complicated and elusive. 3 Nevertheless, plaintiffs continue to file
suits claiming that their creative works have been infringed and
courts must establish effective ways to determine whether the
works are similar enough to rise to the level of improper
appropriation.
A plaintiff who feels that her work has been infringed upon
by a similar work must demonstrate to the court that the
similarity constitutes infringement under federal copyright law. 4
If a court decides that the works are similar, it is often difficult
to determine whether the court applied a test to reach its
conclusion or rather utilized a test to explain the perceived
similarity. 5 At times, it may seem like courts are going by an “I
know it when I see it” means to determine similarity. 6
There is a great amount of confusion among courts and
commentators as to what the proper test is for determining
whether two works are “substantially similar” so as to constitute
copyright infringement. The various tests currently available are
ultimately supposed to further the underlying goal of copyright
law, which is to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
COPYRIGHT LAW 692 (6th ed. 2003).
3
Robert Bernstein & Robert W. Clarida, ‘Ay There’s the Rug,’
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 19, 2003, at 3.
4
See B. MacPaul Stanfield, Note, Finding the Fact of Familiarity:
Assessing Judicial Similarity Tests in Copyright Infringement Actions, 49
DRAKE L. REV. 489, 492 (2001).
5
Id. It is possible that the tests currently articulated by the Circuits
are not a means to determine similarity, but rather a means to
explain a finding of similarity that is determined in such a way
that defies clear explanation . . . . The confusing array of tests
is not merely a means to prove similarity; it provides a lexicon
to explain what is similar, the extent of similarity, and whether
the similarity constitutes copyright infringement.
Id. at 512.
6
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(stating with regard to a definition of pornography and obscenity: “I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never
succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it . . . .”).
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Arts.” 7 Thus, courts are ultimately supposed to establish
incentives for the creation of artistic works.
However, despite the uniform policy underlying copyright
law, courts have created a variety of conflicting and often times
confusing tests. Currently, there are two main tests that most
courts follow: (1) the ordinary observer test associated with the
Second Circuit and (2) the Ninth Circuit’s extrinsic/intrinsic test.
Some courts utilize the abstraction/filtration/comparison test,
while others use variations or a combination of each of these
tests.
In addition to the confusion about what test should be used,
the tests that have been articulated by the circuits are
complicated and vague. 8 Compounding the problem, courts
frequently apply the tests inconsistently and incorrectly. 9 As a
result, decisions in copyright infringement cases are
unpredictable and often seem ad hoc. 10 As the tests become
increasingly elusive for both courts and litigants, it is important
to consider whether there should be one single test articulated by
the Supreme Court, or rather, whether there should be a test at
all.
It is therefore important to examine and critique the myriad
of tests currently available to determine whether two works are
substantially similar, and to articulate an approach more aligned
with the underlying policies of copyright law.
Part I of this Note will briefly review the history and
purpose of copyright law. Part II will present an overview of the
origin of substantial similarity in copyright infringement cases.
Part III examines the different approaches articulated by the
circuits to assess substantial similarity. While this examination is
lengthy, it is necessary to effectuate the solution proffered by
7

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Jarrod M. Mohler, Comment, Toward a Better Understanding of
Substantial Similarity in Copyright Infringement Cases, 68 U. CIN. L. REV.
971, 972 (2000).
9
Id.
10
Jeannette R. Busek, Comment, Copyright Infringement: A Proposal
for a New Standard for Substantial Similarity Based on the Degree of
Possible Expressive Variation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1777, 1778 (1998).
8
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this Note. Finally, Part IV proposes that courts should cease
attempting to create a single test for substantial similarity.
Proving similarity and infringement is not amenable to a onesize-fits-all test, especially given the many categories of
expressions and types of media that are protected by
copyright. 11 Instead of trying to wade through the confusing
array of tests available or attempting to articulate a single test,
courts should articulate a standard that goes to the ultimate
purpose of copyright law. Thus, in order to determine if there
has been copyright infringement, a court should determine
whether or not providing relief for the owner of the copyright
will enhance the policy goals of copyright law and the objectives
of Congress.
I. COPYRIGHT LAW IN GENERAL
The following sections will discuss the policy considerations
underlying federal copyright law and the elements that are
required in order for a plaintiff to bring an action for copyright
infringement.
A. General Policy Considerations Behind Copyright Law
The United States Constitution empowered Congress to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 12 The current
governing statue enacted by Congress is the Copyright Act of
1976. 13 Copyright protection is extended to “authors” 14 for any
11

Stanfield, supra note 4, at 512.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. The first
copyright law, enacted by Congress in 1790, provided for two 14-year terms
of protection and was entitled: “An act for the encouragement of learning.”
COHEN, ET AL., supra note 1, at 22 (quoting Copyright Act of 1790, 1st
Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790)). In 1909, the Copyright Act
underwent an overhaul, including revisions to the categories of works
protected by the law and an extension of the term of copyright protection.
12
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“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression” 15 for a given period of time. 16 Works that come
within the scope of the Copyright Act are afforded strong
protections, for example “the Act specifies in detail the kinds of
works that are protected and for how long; creates protection
even without registration or notice; assigns exclusive rights and
allows for transfer and division of ownership and rights; and
creates various remedies including damages and fines.” 17
While Congress provided a benefit to a copyright holder in
granting specific exclusive rights to uses pertaining to
reproduction, preparation of derivative works, distribution, and
public performances and displays of the work, 18 the primary
COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 24-26. The 1976 Copyright was enacted as a
result of the emergence of new technologies and the perceived inadequacies
of the 1909 Act. Id. at 27. While the 1976 Act has undergone changes since
it took effect on January 1, 1978, it provides the basic structure for copyright
law in the United States today. Id.
14
17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title
vests initially in the author or authors of the work.”).
15
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
16
Id. Jason Mazzone has also opined:
To the benefit of authors, Congress has taken a liberal view of
its constitutional power to afford protection for ‘limited Times.’
In the very first copyright statute, the period of copyright lasted
just fourteen years, renewable for an additional fourteen years.
As a result of the amendments to the 1976 Act made by the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, copyright in works
created on or after January 1, 1978 now lasts for the life of the
author plus seventy years.
Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026 (2006) (citations
omitted).
17
Mazzone, supra note 16.
18
17 U.S.C. § 106. The exclusive rights of a copyright owner are set
forth in § 106 of the Copyright Act:
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize
any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
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purpose of copyright law is to benefit the public. 19 As a result,
courts are forced to deal with two conflicting public policy
factors. On one side “the law seeks to encourage new authors by
protecting their works” and on the other “the law does not want
to give any one author a monopoly over an idea so as to
foreclose future authors from building on that idea.” 20 Thus,
courts are left with the difficult task of encouraging creativity by
affording authors the opportunity to reap the benefits of their
creative works, while simultaneously permitting future authors
to create new works by expanding upon the ideas of others. 21
In order to effect the constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the
Progress of Science and useful Arts,” 22 copyright legislation
“assures authors the right to their original expression, but
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information

work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly and;
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission. Id.
19
Stanfield, supra note 4, at 493.
20
Busek, supra note 10, at 1777-78.
21
Mohler, supra note 8, at 974; see also Warner Bros. Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Companies, 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that “[i]t
is a fundamental objective of copyright law to foster creativity. However, that
law has the capacity both to augment and diminish the prospects for
creativity. By assuring the author of an original work the exclusive benefits
of whatever commercial success his or her work enjoys, the law obviously
promotes creativity. At the same time, it can deter the creation of new works
if authors are fearful that their creations will too readily be found to be
substantially similar to preexisting works.”).
22
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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conveyed by a work.” 23 Thus, it is a fundamental precept of
copyright law that ideas and facts are not protected—only the
expression of an idea can be protected. 24 This distinction has the
purpose of defining the line between what can be protected by
copyright law and what should remain in the public domain. 25
But, making the distinction between idea and expression is
often difficult. 26 In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., Judge
Learned Hand provided the following guidance:
Upon a work . . . a great number of patterns
increasingly fit equally well, as more and more of the
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the [work] is
about, and at times consist only of its title; but there
is a point in this series of abstraction where they are
no longer protected, since otherwise the [author]
could prevent the use of his “ideas” to which, apart
from their expression, his property is never
extended. 27
23

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50
(1991).
24
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 207 (1954); see also 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) (asserting that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
25
COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 72.
26
See id. at 74, 80.
27
45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). This is what many commentators
and courts call the “abstractions test.” While this test has
received continuous use by courts in copyright infringement cases,
it has also been criticized by courts and commentators as not being
at “test” at all . . . . The abstractions test, in reality, is just a
restatement of general policy that copyright law protects the
expression of ideas but not the ideas themselves. The test provides
no further guidance or insight into which works should be
protected. Thus, although courts often cite the test as reasoning for
their decisions, such citations ultimately fail to explain the
underlying reason why courts decide copyright cases as they do.
Busek, supra note 10, at 1789 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
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In Nichols, Hand articulated a standard that is not so much a
way for courts to perceive similarity but rather a means to
separate ideas from the expression of those ideas. 28
This idea-expression dichotomy plays an important role in
ultimately determining whether a copyrighted work has been
infringed. Federal copyright law endeavors to strike the proper
balance between protecting an author’s expression of an idea and
encouraging the idea itself. 29 As a result, courts must address
what is similar about two works and if the only similarity shared
is similar ideas, then there has been no infringement. 30 The
court must determine whether there are similarities in expression
between two works, and if similarities in expression do exist,
whether they cross a threshold of similarity that constitutes
copyright infringement.
The distinction between ideas and expression is a source of
great confusion for courts and litigants. Unfortunately, there is
no bright line rule as to what constitutes an idea and what
constitutes an expression of that idea. As such, courts must
engage in a delicate balancing between idea and expression when
assessing whether two works are substantially similar so as to
constitute copyright infringement.
A major concern with courts providing too much protection
when making distinctions between idea and expression is that
eventually nothing would be left in the public domain and
incentives to create new works would vanish because an author
would find it difficult not to infringe upon previous authors’
works. 31 Unfortunately, the tests currently available to assess
substantial similarity do not provide courts with adequate
guidance on making these difficult distinctions between what is
protectible and what is unprotectible.

Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990)).
28
Stanfield, supra note 4, at 500.
29
Busek, supra note 10, at 1778.
30
Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.
1983) (stating that “[t]he similarity to be assessed must concern the
expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves.”).
31
Mohler, supra note 8, at 974.
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B. Elements of a Copyright Infringement Claim
A plaintiff bringing a claim for copyright infringement must
prove two elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2)
that defendant violated one of the exclusive rights under section
106 of the Copyright Act (e.g., the right to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords, §106(1), or the
right to prepare derivative works, §106(2)). 32 In general, with
respect to the first element, the copyright registration certificate
serves as prima facie evidence for the plaintiff that a valid
copyright exists. 33 With respect to the second element, for
claims of violations of the right to reproduce the work, §106(1),
the plaintiff must prove “copying of the constituent elements of
the work that are original.”34
Proof of copying consists of two separate components. 35
First, there is the issue of whether copying occurred. 36 Next,
there is the issue of whether such copying is actionable (i.e.
32

COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 314. “Notably absent from this
formulation of the prima facie case is damage or any harm to plaintiff
resulting from the infringement.” Nimmer on Copyright § 13.01, 4-13
[hereinafter Nimmer].
33
See Nimmer § 13.01[A].
34
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361
(1991).
35
See Nimmer § 13.01[B].
36
Id. (stating that “[i]t is generally not possible to establish copying as a
factual matter by direct evidence, as it is rare that the plaintiff has available a
witness to the physical act of copying . . . . Therefore, copying is ordinarily
established indirectly by the plaintiff’s proof of access and substantial
similarity . . . . [I]n the previous formulation, the term ‘substantial similarity’
[should] be discarded in favor of ‘probative similarity.’ In other words, when
the question is copying as a factual matter, then similarities that, in the
normal course of events, would not be expected to arise independently if the
two works are probative of defendant’s having copied as a factual matter
from plaintiff’s work . . . . [D]espite proof of access and probative
similarity, the trier of fact may be upheld in finding no copying if such trier
believes the defendant’s evidence is an independent creation, except where
the similarity between the two works is such that no explanation other than
copying is reasonably possible.”).
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whether there was too much copying). 37 A plaintiff must
demonstrate both copying and too much copying in order to
prevail. 38 Therefore, even where a defendant concedes copying,
no legal consequences will follow unless the court determines
that the copying is substantial. 39 In order to establish that there
has been too much copying, or improper appropriation, a
plaintiff must show that there is substantial similarity between
the plaintiff’s work and defendant’s work. 40
II. SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY: AN OVERVIEW
Substantial similarity is a concept that is mystifying for both
courts and litigants. 41 In order for an appropriation to be
actionable, a plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant’s work is
substantially similar to plaintiff’s work such that defendant is
liable for copyright infringement. 42 Substantial similarity is a
conclusion; it is not a formula or a test. 43
It is the task of the court to determine whether the
defendant’s copying is sufficient to constitute infringement. The
scope of works that copyright law protects is very broad: from
literary works, including books, movies and poems, to
sculptures, paintings and photographs, to musical works and
computer programs. 44 In attempting to cover such a variety of
37

See id.
See id. (explaining that “copying as a factual matter is insufficient if
improper appropriation is lacking. Conversely, even when two works are
substantially similar with respect to protectible expression, if the defendant
did not copy as a factual matter, but instead independently created the work
at issue, then infringement liability must be denied.”).
39
See id. § 13.03[A].
40
See id.
41
See Eric C. Osterberg, The Meaning and Significance of Substantial
Similarity, 863 PLI/PAT 23, 28 (2006).
42
See Nimmer § 13.01[B].
43
Osterberg, supra note 41, at 29.
44
The statutory coverage of copyright law provides that:
[w]orks of authorship include the following categories: (1)
literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying
words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
38
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works, the current standards for assessing substantial similarity
adopted by courts are unclear, with results that are “inevitably
ad hoc.” 45
Currently, there is a split in the circuit courts regarding
which test is proper for assessing whether protectible elements
in a work are substantially similar in a copyright infringement
claim. 46 Courts continually attempt to fashion and re-work tests
in an effort to reduce the amount of confusion and clarify the
notion of substantial similarity. However, these efforts have
ultimately led to more confusion and ambiguity about the
appropriate standard for determining whether two works are
substantial similar. 47
There are two primary tests that most courts follow: the
“ordinary observer” test associated with the Second Circuit or
the two-part “extrinsic/intrinsic” test associated with the Ninth
Circuit. 48 The “ordinary observer” test adopted by the Second
Circuit asks “whether an average lay observer would recognize
the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the
copyrighted work.” 49 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has adopted
an alternative two-part test that includes an objective extrinsic
test and a subjective intrinsic test. 50 On the extrinsic prong the
court engages in an objective comparison of specific expressive
elements whereas on the subjective intrinsic prong the court
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; (8) architectural works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
45
Busek, supra note 10, at 1778-79 (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v.
Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).
46
ROBERT C. OSTERBERG AND ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL
SIMILARITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW § 3, at 3-2 (Practicing Law Institute 2003)
[hereinafter, OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG].
47
See Busek, supra note 10, at 1779.
48
Murray Hill Publ’n, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361
F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Nimmer § 13.03(E)(3).
49
Knitwaves, Inc v Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995)
(quoting Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir.
1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50
See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004).
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focuses on the total concept and feel of the two works. 51
While most courts use either the Second Circuit’s “ordinary
observer test” 52 or the Ninth Circuit’s “extrinsic/intrinsic test” 53
there are some variations. For example, the Tenth Circuit uses
the abstraction/filtration/comparison test and the Sixth Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit use a variation of this test. 54 The Eleventh
Circuit uses a test that is similar to the tests used by the Second
and Ninth Circuit before they diverged. 55
All of these tests have their merits and their faults. While
they seem sound in theory, in reality, courts inconsistently apply
them. 56 This inconsistency has led to confusion and
unpredictability for courts and litigants as to where to draw the
line between protectible and unprotectible material. None of the
tests currently available provide a clear analytical framework.
Additionally, none of the existing tests provide hard and fast
rules for courts and litigants to follow. 57 The following sections
attempt to bring clarity to this confusion by conducting a
thorough examination of the various tests available for assessing
substantial similarity.

51

See Cavalier v. Random House, 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002).
The circuits that follow the ordinary observer test are the First
Circuit, the Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit.
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3, at 3-2.
53
The circuits that follow the extrinsic/intrinsic test model are the
Fourth Circuit and the Eighth Circuit. See id.
54
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3, at 3-2.
55
Id.
56
See Mohler, supra note 8, at 972.
57
It is certainly debatable whether it is better to have clear rules or,
rather, concepts and principles that people can use to regulate their lives. The
difficulty with clear rules is they are often over or under inclusive; whereas,
the difficulty with concepts and principles is that they are often unclear and it
is difficult for people to regulate their lives with certainty.
52
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III. CIRCUIT SPLITS: THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR
ASSESSING SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
This section will examine the numerous tests available for
assessing substantial similarity. First, this section will examine
the “ordinary observer” test articulated by the Second Circuit
followed by an analysis of the courts that follow the Second
Circuit. Next, the “extrinsic/intrinsic” test associated with the
Ninth Circuit will be analyzed followed by an assessment of the
courts that follow the Ninth Circuit. Finally, this section will
address the tests utilized by the remaining circuits, including the
Abstraction/Filtration/Comparison test.
A. The Second Circuit’s Ordinary Observer Test
The Second Circuit’s test for assessing substantial similarity
in a copyright infringement case is the “ordinary observer”
test. 58 In Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weinder Corp., a
58

Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (holding that in
order to establish infringement, a plaintiff must prove both “(a) that
defendant copied from plaintiff’s copyrighted work and (b) that the copying
(assuming it to be proved) went too far as to constitute improper
appropriation.”). Further,
The copyright infringement test in the Second Circuit is a stepby-step process. First, the court determines whether the
defendant copied from the plaintiff. In cases where the defendant
denies copying, the court tests to see whether the defendant had
access to plaintiff’s work at the time defendant prepared his
work, and whether there is sufficient similarity between the
works to prove copying. The Second Circuit has clarified that
the correct term for this threshold determination of similarity is
“probative similarity” rather than “substantial similarity.” On
the probative similarity issue, “analytic dissection” is
appropriate and the testimony of experts may be received to aid
the trier of facts . . . . If the court determines that there has
been copying, then only does there arise the second issue, that
of illicit copying “unlawful appropriation.” The court must then
determine whether defendant’s taking is sufficient to constitute
infringement. It is that part of the inquiry that is the “substantial

NICOLE.DOC

1388

7/1/2007 11:28 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

case involving the alleged infringement of a design printed on
cloth, used to make women’s dresses, Judge Learned Hand
articulated that there is substantial similarity where “the ordinary
observer, unless set out to detect the disparities, would be
disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as
the same.” 59
More recently, in Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, a case
involving the infringement of plaintiff’s copyrighted squirrel and
leaf children’s sweater designs, the Second Circuit stated that the
ordinary observer test asks whether “an average lay observer
would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated
from the copyrighted work.” 60 In making this assessment, courts
examine the works’ “total concept and feel.”61
The Second Circuit allows the use of expert testimony on the
issue of whether there was copying, but does not allow the use
of expert testimony on the issue of whether there was too much
copying (utilizing a substantial similarity analysis). 62 In Arnstein
v. Porter, the plaintiff, Ira B. Arnstein, brought an action
similarity” test.
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.1, at 3-3.
59
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weinder Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489
(2d Cir. 1960).
60
Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995).
61
Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1003.
The total concept and feel test has . . . . been strongly
criticized. Rather than clarifying what substantial similarity
means, total concept and feel actually makes the inquiry even
murkier. [N]o one knows what concept and feel means, and no
court that uses the test has attempted to define the terms.
Moreover, the test is problematic because it is contrary to the
specific language of section 102(b) of the Copyright Act which
clearly states that [i]n no case does copyright protection . . .
extend to any . . . concept.
Busek, supra note 10, at 1803 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Matthew M. Fortnow, Note, Why the “Look and Feel” of Computer
Software Should Note Receive Copyright Protection, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
421, 425 (1992); 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
62
Further discussion of the Circuit’s split regarding the use of expert
testimony in assessing substantial similarity follows later in this Note at
Section III.D.
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against Cole Porter for infringement of the copyright to his
musical compositions. 63 The court in Arnstein justified the
ordinary observer test being applied on the issue of assessing
substantial similarity without any analytic dissection or expert
opinion. 64 The judge rationalized that “[t]he plaintiff’s legally
protected interest is not, as such, his reputation as a musician
but his interest in the potential financial returns from his
compositions which derive from the lay public’s approbation of
his efforts.” 65 The question, therefore, is “whether defendant
took from plaintiff’s work so much of what is pleasing to the
ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for whom such
popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully
appropriated something which belongs to the plaintiff.” 66
Since its creation, the ordinary observer test has been
criticized and as will be discussed later in this Note, this test has
become a source of confusion and frustration as courts struggle
to determine whether works should be evaluated from the
viewpoint of the ordinary observer or as the above quote from
Arnstein suggests, from the viewpoint of the intended
audience. 67
One important concern with regard to courts in the Second
Circuit allowing expert testimony on the issue of copying but not
on the issue of too much copying is whether it is possible for
courts to do this in reality. 68 As one court noted:
[T]he distinction between the two parts of the
Arnstein test may be of doubtful value when the
63

154 F.2d at 468.
Id. (finding that on the issue of “illicit copying (unlawful
appropriation) . . . the test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer;
accordingly, on that issue, ‘dissection’ and expert testimony are irrelevant”).
65
Id. at 473.
66
Id.
67
Osterberg, supra note 41, at 29.
68
It is possible that when courts describe similarities, they are getting
that information from expert testimony that was allowed on the question of
copying but then prohibited on the question of whether the two works were
substantially similar. See Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.,
797 F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1986).
64
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finder of fact is the same person for each step: that
person has been exposed to expert evidence in the
first step, yet she or he is supposed to ignore or
“forget” that evidence in analyzing the problem under
the second step. Especially in complex cases, we
doubt that the forgetting can be effective when the
expert testimony is essential to even the most
fundamental understanding of the objects in
question. 69
Thus, the Arnstein limitation may be more theoretical than
practical. 70 The other circuit courts have conflicting views on
whether expert testimony may be utilized in assisting the fact
finder with the substantial similarity analysis. The allowance or
prohibition of expert testimony is one more confusing and
controversial aspects of the current state of the circuit courts’
analyses of substantial similarity.
In the Second Circuit, both the issue of whether there was
copying and the issue of whether there was too much copying
(unlawful appropriation) are issues of fact for the jury. 71
However, a court may determine “noninfringement as a matter
of law on a motion for summary judgment either when the
similarity concerns only noncopyrightable elements 72 of
plaintiff’s work, or when no reasonable trier of fact could find
the works substantially similar.” 73
69

Id.
Michael Der Manuelian, Note, The Role of the Expert Witness in the
Music Copyright Infringement Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 145 (1988).
71
Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469.
72
Alexandra DeNeve argues that:
Uncopyrightable elements include but are not limited to: (a)
Ideas (copyright protects expression not ideas) (b) Systems or
methods of operation ‘regardless of the form in which it is
described explained, illustrated or embodied’ (see § 102) (c)
Historical facts . . . (d) General facts . . . (e) Concepts (f)
Character names (protected by trademark) (g) Undeveloped
characters described in words (h) Scenes a faire.
Alexandra N. DeNeve, Copyright Infringement Litigation, 871 PLI/PAT 89
(July 2006).
73
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1986)
70
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A common criticism of the ordinary observer test is that “it
assumes the reaction of an ordinary observer, when asked
whether two works strike him or her as substantially similar, is
an accurate guide to determining if the protected expression of a
work has been copied rather than its ideas.” 74 Other critics have
argued “that the ordinary observer test creates an overly naïve
and unsophisticated standard that is inappropriate for deciding
the often subtle question of distinguishing similarity of ideas
from similarity of expression.” 75 Additionally, when the works
at issue are particularly complex such as computer programs or
musical works, the ordinary observer test does not work and is a
source of confusion and frustration for courts and litigants
alike. 76
B. Circuits That Follow that Second Circuit’s Ordinary
Observer Test
1. The First Circuit
The First Circuit follows the Second Circuit and uses the
ordinary observer test to assess substantial similarity but its
treatment of the substantial similarity issue does little to clarify
the confusion. 77 In Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co., a
(citing Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Co., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983).
74
Howard B. Abrams, Copying of Protected Expression—The Second
Circuit and the “Ordinary Lay Observer” test, 2 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT §
14:23 (Database updated October 2006).
75
Id.
76
See Whelan v. Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 797
F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Abrams, supra note 74.
77
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.2, at 3-9; see also
Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitware Co., 207 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2000);
Concrete Mach. Co., v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc. 843 F.2d 600 (1st
Cir. 1988); O’Neill v. Dell Pub. Co., 630 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1980)). The
First Circuit requires courts to first determine whether there was copying.
Once copying is shown, by direct evidence, proof of access and probative (or
substantial) similarity, the court then determines whether there has been
unlawful appropriation of the original work by determining whether the
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clothier successfully sued a competitor for infringement of the
clothier’s copyrighted designs for women’s sweaters. 78 In
determining that the competitor’s design for women’s sweater
was substantially similar to the plaintiff’s design, the court stated
that the inquiry is “whether the accused work is so similar to the
plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would
conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the
plaintiff’s protectible expression by taking material of substance
and value.” 79
Generally, expert testimony is not permitted to aid in the
substantial similarity inquiry. 80 On summary judgment, courts in
the First Circuit utilize the ordinary observer test to determine
substantial similarity. 81 Courts may grant summary judgment to
a defendant when “the only finding that could be reached by a
fact finder, correctly applying the applicable legal standard, is
that there is no ‘substantial similarity’ between the two
works.” 82
The First Circuit’s analysis generally is consistent with that
of the Second Circuit and as such has the same difficulties
discussed earlier in this Note. 83 Additionally, as evidenced in
Segrets, the ordinary observer test is subject to arbitrary line
drawing by the court when asked to determine how many
variations or alterations of the plaintiff’s work by the defendant
are sufficient to preclude a finding of substantial similarity. 84
copying was enough to establish substantial similarity of the two works.
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.2, at 3-9.
78
207 F.3d at 62.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 66 n.11.
81
See id. at 62; see also Concrete Mach. Co., 843 F.2d at 611.
82
O’Neill v. Dell Pub. Co., Inc., 630 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1980).
83
See section III.A of this Note.
84
See 207 F.3d at 65-66 (stating that “[s]light or trivial variations
between works will not preclude a finding of infringement under the ordinary
observer test . . . . At times, the existence of only minor differences may
itself suggest copying, indicating that the infringer attempted to avoid liability
by contributing only trivial variations. This is not to suggest that an artist
cannot avoid infringement by intentionally making substantial alterations in
the design of a copyrighted work so as to provide a substantially different
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2. The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit also follows the Second Circuit in their
evaluation of substantial similarity. 85 In Dam Things From
Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., a Danish owner of copyrights in
troll dolls sought to preliminarily enjoin a United States
competitor from infringing its copyrights. 86 Although the court
did not consider the infringement analysis because the defendant
conceded infringement, the court stated that in order to prove
substantial similarity or unlawful appropriation, the fact finder
determines whether an ordinary lay observer would decide that
the works were substantially similar. 87
expression of the idea embodied in the copyrighted work.”); see also
Concrete Mach. Co., 843 F.2d at 608 (quoting Nimmer on Copyright §
13.03[B], at 13-43) (citations omitted) (holding that only when “the points of
dissimilarity not only exceed the points of similarity, but indicate that the
remaining points of similarity are (within the context of plaintiff’s work) of
minimal importance either quantitatively or qualitatively, [that] no
infringement results.”).
85
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.1, at 3-3; see also R.
Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199, 207-208 (3d Cir. 2005);
Dam Things From Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 562 (3d
Cir. 2002). Further,
[t]he plaintiff must prove both that the defendant copied the
protected work and that there is substantial similarity between
the two works. If there is no direct evidence of copying,
copying must be shown by proving access and substantial
similarity. Thus, as in some other courts, the term “substantial
similarity” has two meanings in the Third Circuit . . . . As in
the Second Circuit, substantial similarity that proves copying
means that there is sufficient similarity between the two works
in question to conclude that the accused infringer used the
copyrighted work in making his work. Substantial similarity that
proves unlawful appropriation means that the accused infringer
took a significant portion of the independent work of the
copyright owner that is entitled to the statutory protection.
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.1, at 3-3.
86
Dam Things, 290 F.3d at 552.
87
See Dam Things, 290 F.3d at 562 (stating that the fact-finder from the
perspective of the lay observer must determine whether the copying was an
unlawful appropriation of the copyrighted work); see also Universal Athletic
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In Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, the Third Circuit
evaluated substantial similarity by recording the court’s
“impressions as they would appear to a layman viewing the two
[works] side by side . . . concentrat[ing] upon the gross features
rather than an examination of the minutiae.” 88 The court
examined the plaintiff’s wall chart for use with plaintiff’s weight
lifting machine and the allegedly infringing chart of the
defendant’s and discussed the most obvious differences
(including color and arrangement) and similarities (including the
use of stick figures and their corresponding positions of the
figures for each exercise). 89 The court ultimately reached the
conclusion that a lay observer could not find substantial
similarity between the two charts because while the ideas were
similar, the expressions were not substantially so. 90
The Third Circuit, employs a special test for computer
programs, which has not been extended beyond computer related
cases. 91 This modified test permits a single substantial similarity
inquiry whereby both the ordinary lay observer analysis and
expert testimony are considered. 92 In allowing this contravention
of previously articulated law of the circuit, the court reasoned
that the “ordinary observer test, which was developed in case
involving novels, plays, and paintings, and which does not
permit expert testimony, is of doubtful value involving computer
programs on account of the programs’ complexity and
unfamiliarity to most members of the public.” 93
Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975) (articulating that “it
must be shown that copying went so far as to constitute improper
appropriation, the test being the response of the ordinary lay person.”).
88
Id. at 908.
89
Id. at 909.
90
Id.
91
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.3, at 3-16.
92
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232-33 (3d
Cir. 1986) (holding that the court joins “the growing number of courts which
do not apply the ordinary observer test in copyright cases involving
exceptionally difficult materials, like computer programs, but instead adopt a
single substantial similarity inquiry according to which both lay and expert
testimony would be admissible.”).
93
Id. at 1232 (citing Howard Root, Note, Copyright Infringement of
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The Third Circuit’s approach highlights the inconsistencies
with the substantial similarity doctrine and its application to
different types of works. In addition to the problems articulated
by the Third Circuit with applying the ordinary observer test to
computer programs, this test is difficult to apply in other
complex subject matters, for example where the lay public may
not possess the specialized expertise to compare two similar
musical arrangements. 94
3. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit follows the Second Circuit’s use of the
ordinary observer test. 95 The Fifth Circuit in Gen. Universal
Sys., Inc. v. Lee, dismissed plaintiff’s copyright action against a
defendant for infringement of plaintiff’s freight packaging
software system. 96 The court stated that in determining whether
“the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to
protectible elements of the infringed work . . . [a] side-by-side
comparison [is] made between the original and the copy to
Computer Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68
MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1285-88 (1984); Note, Copyright Infringement Actions:
The Proper Role for Audience Reactions in Determining Substantial
Similarity, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1981) (“criticizing lay observer standard
when objects in question are intended for particular, identifiable audiences”).
94
Abrams, supra note 74; see also Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc.,
905 F.2d 731, 737 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating that in order to “warrant
departure from the lay characterization of the ordinary observer test,
‘specialized expertise’ must go beyond mere differences in taste and instead
must rise to the level of the possession of knowledge that the lay public
lacks.”).
95
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.4, at 3-6. See also
Positive Black Talk, Inc. v. Cash Money Records, Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 36768 (5th Cir. 2004); Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lee, 379 F.3d 131, 141-42
(5th Cir. 2004); Bridgmon v. Array Sys. Corp., 325 F.3d 572, 576-77 (5th
Cir. 2003). The Fifth Circuit’s substantial similarity inquiry follows the
Second Circuit: “Fifth Circuit courts make the same distinction between
probative and substantial similarity: access plus probative similarity leads to
the inference of copying; copying plus substantial similarity equals
infringement.” OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.4, at 3-6.
96
Gen. Universal Sys., 379 F.3d at 145-46.
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determine whether a layman would view the two works as
‘substantially similar.’” 97 Additionally, the court upheld the
lower court’s granting of defendant’s summary judgment where
the plaintiff “failed to attach any of its own source code to its
summary judgment motion . . . . Without providing its own
source code for comparison, [Plaintiff] did not satisfy the
requirement that the infringed and infringing work be compared
side-by-side.” 98 Thus, a side-by-side comparison of the two
works is mandatory; a plaintiff who does not or cannot produce
the works to do this comparison, cannot prevail. 99
As evidenced in Gen. Universal Sys., the side-by-side
approach articulated by the Fifth Circuit has the potential to
throw out of court possibly meritorious claims on the basis that
the party cannot provide the alleged infringing work to do a
side-by-side comparison. 100 This seems an unduly unfair
approach.
4. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit’s substantial similarity inquiry is similar
to that of the Second Circuit (and the Fifth Circuit). 101 The
Seventh Circuit also uses the ordinary observer test to assess
substantial similarity. The fact finder must determine “whether
the accused work is so similar to the plaintiff’s work that an
ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant
unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protectible expression by
97

Id. at 142 (quoting Creations Unlimited v. McCain, 112 F.3d 814, 816
(5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98
Id. at 146.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.5, at 3-18; see also
Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502 (7th Cir.
1994); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607,
614-615 (7th Cir. 1982). “Courts in the Seventh Circuit make a distinction
between probative similarity, similarity that proves copying, and substantial
similarity, similarity that proves unlawful appropriation.” OSTERBERG &
OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.5, at 3-18.
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taking material of substance and value.” 102 The Seventh Circuit
in Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., after
conducting an “ocular comparison” found that defendant’s K.C.
Munchkin audiovisual game captured the total concept and feel
of plaintiff’s copyrighted PAC-MAN audiovisual game. 103
Additionally, like the Fifth Circuit, courts in the Seventh
Circuit conduct a side-by-side comparison of the two works. 104
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, a side-by-side comparison is permitted
but is not mandatory. 105 In Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol
Wright Sales, Inc. the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s
determination that that there was substantial similarity between
defendant’s Precious Pet Duffle bags and plaintiff’s Wildlife
Critters bags to constitute infringement.106 The court, in addition
to reviewing the findings of the district court, conducted a sideby-side comparison of the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s bags,
which both had animal heads and tails attached to the ends of the
bags. The court concluded that the total concept and feel of the
two works were substantially similar so as to constitute unlawful
appropriation. 107

102

Atari, 672 F.2d at 614.
672 F.2d at 619-20.
104
Wildlife Express, 18 F.3d at 507 n.1. The Seventh Circuit’s
substantial similarity doctrine
differs from that of many other circuits in that the Seventh
Circuit has held that there is a range of protection for
copyrighted works similar to the range of protection for
trademarks in trademark law. Where idea and expression are
indistinguishable in plaintiff’s work, plaintiff’s work is weak and
protected only from identical copying or very close
paraphrasing. As the work embodies more in the way of
particularized expression, it becomes stronger and receives
broader copyright protection. The other circuits that have
sanctioned this trademark-law type range of protection are the
First and Third Circuits.
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:1.5, at 3-20.
105
Wildlife Express, 18 F.3d at 507 n. 1.
106
Id. at 511.
107
Id. at 510-11.
103
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C. The Ninth Circuit’s Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test

The substantial similarity test in the Ninth Circuit is a two
part analysis containing an extrinsic and an intrinsic
component. 108 First, courts examine the two works under the
extrinsic test, which is objective in nature. 109 The extrinsic
analysis “depends not on the responses of the trier of fact, but
on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed.” 110 In
Shaw v. Lindheim, a writer of a television pilot script brought a
copyright infringement action against another writer. 111 The
court articulated that rather than comparing the ideas contained
in the two works, courts list the elements of the works and
analyze whether there are similarities in the expression of those
elements. 112
When applying the extrinsic test, a court in the Ninth Circuit
is instructed to “filter out and disregard the non-protectible
elements in making its substantial similarity determination.” 113
This process is referred to as “analytical dissection” 114 which
108

See Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 2004).
See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the extrinsic part of the test is an objective analysis of expression).
110
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). When applying the extrinsic test, when
looking at literary works, district courts in the Ninth Circuit are instructed to
compare “not the basic plot ideas for stories, but the actual concrete elements
that make up the total sequence of events and the relationships between the
major characters.” Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985).
111
919 F.2d at 1353.
112
Id. at 1362. The elements that courts list and analyze are:
[f]or example, with respect to literary works, the elements are
plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, sequence of events,
and characters. For works of visual art, the criterion includes
shapes, colors, and arrangements of the representations in
addition to the type of artwork involved, the materials used, the
subject matter, and the setting for the subject.
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.1, at 3-23.
113
Cavalier v. Random House Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citing Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1361).
114
Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845.
109
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involves breaking works down into their constituent elements
and comparing those elements to determine whether the
similarities that exist are in the unprotectible elements (for
example ideas or scenes a faire 115 ). 116
It is important to note that while individual elements may not
be protectible, a court can still find that the combination of those
elements (selection, coordination, and arrangement), can be
protectible. 117 In Shaw, the court compared “the individual
features of the works to find specific similarities between the
plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and
sequence of events.” 118 Ultimately, the court found that the
objective similarities in protected expression under the extrinsic
test were present and concluded that the plaintiff presented a
triable issue of fact regarding the substantial similarity of the
two works. 119
The intrinsic test, which examines an ordinary person’s
subjective impressions of the similarities between two works, is
exclusively a question that is left to the jury. 120 Once the court
in Shaw made the determination that extrinsic similarities were
present, the court reversed the district court’s granting of
summary judgment to allow the fact finder to determine whether
intrinsic similarities existed between the two works. 121
115

See Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 815 (defining scenes a faire as “situations
and incidents that flow necessarily or naturally from a basic plot premise.”).
116
See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.1, 3-23 (stating
that “[b]ecause similarities in elements that are not protectible cannot count in
the plaintiff’s favor in the infringement analysis, they are filtered out in the
extrinsic analysis and not considered as part of the intrinsic analysis.”).
117
Id. at 3-24 (citing Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2002))
(noting that the court in Metcalf “held that even though the elements common
to both plaintiff’s screenplay and defendant’s television series were not
individually copyrightable, Metcalf passed the extrinsic test because his
combination of unprotectible items was copyrightable.”).
118
919 F.2d at 1362 (citing Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 912 (9th
Cir. 1989); Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
119
Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1362-64.
120
See id. at 1360-61.
121
Id. at 1364.
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The intrinsic test is a subjective evaluation of whether there
is substantial similarity in expressions depending on the response
of the ordinary reasonable observer. 122 Expert testimony is not
permitted in the analysis on the intrinsic portion of the test. 123
This structure presents challenges for the fact finder because the
fact finder is permitted to consider expert testimony when
evaluating extrinsic similarities but, having been exposed to that
testimony, is required to disregard it when evaluating similarities
on the intrinsic portion of the test. 124
The use of experts on the substantial similarity analysis is
one point in particular where the circuits are divergent and thus
potentially provide disparate results depending on the plaintiff’s
forum choice. For example, in contrast to the Second Circuit,
the Ninth Circuit allows the use of expert testimony in assessing
substantial similarity (on the extrinsic portion of the test). Under
the “ordinary observer” test adopted by the Second Circuit, the
determination of “illicit copying (unlawful appropriation) . . . is
the response of the ordinary lay [observer]; accordingly, on that
issue, dissection and expert testimony are irrelevant.” 125
It has been argued that expert witnesses can provide
information that the judge, or the “ordinary observer, who may
not be entirely familiar with literary works or how to identify
scenes a faire cannot.” 126 According to Nimmer:
[T]here will . . . be numerous instances when the
“ordinary observer” is simply not capable of
detecting very real appropriation . . . if the
[defendant’s work] consists merely of clever
juxtaposition and alteration of unessential details in
the plaintiff’s work, plus the addition of a substantial
122

See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
123
See id.
124
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 16.1 at 16-4.
125
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
126
Nimmer § 13.03[E][3][a] (stating that “it is hardly reasonable to
expect laymen . . . to delineate the portion of the plaintiff’s work that it is
protectible” on their own).
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amount of new material so that the resulting product
is unrecognizable by the untutored observer in his
immediate and spontaneous impression, should it be
said, as a matter of law, that no piracy has occurred?
Such a principle renders the fruits of a writer’s labor
safe from all but the clever thieves. 127
Arguably, expert testimony should apply in these contexts
where courts must consider whether, for example, the character
traits in a movie are drawn from a specific work or are instead
part of a stock type, or whether a particular plot twist is scenesa-faire or evidence of copying. 128 These determinations are
difficult for non-experts to make without knowledge of the
context that surrounds the two works—experts could supply
these answers. 129 Accordingly, the use of expert testimony in
this context could aid in a more consistent determination of
similarities of expression.
The extrinsic/intrinsic test has been widely criticized even by
the very court that created it. 130 The major criticism of the test
is that it is hard to understand and not easy to apply. 131 The
Ninth Circuit has recognized the difficulties of applying the test
and in Metcalf v. Bochco, described the extrinsic test as “turbid
waters.” 132 Moreover, in Swirsky v. Carey, the court noted that
“[t]he application of the extrinsic test, which assesses substantial
similarity of ideas and expression, to musical compositions is a
somewhat unnatural task, guided by relatively little precedent . .
. . The extrinsic test provides an awkward framework to apply
to copyrighted works like music or art objects, which lack
distinct element of ideas and expression.” 133 But, the court went
127

Nimmer § 13.03 [E][2].
See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990)
(allowing expert testimony on plot); Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 848
(9th Cir. 2004) (reversing defendant’s summary judgment motion because
expert affidavit created issue of material fact on stock elements).
129
See Nimmer § 13.03[E][3][a].
130
See Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 848.
131
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.1 at 3-29.
132
294 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2002).
133
376 F.3d at 848.
128
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on to conclude: “the test is our law and we must apply it.” 134
In addition to the problems discussed by the Ninth Circuit
itself, the extrinsic/intrinsic test clouds the distinction between
ideas and expression and makes it difficult to apply to certain
types of works. For example, it may be very difficult to separate
out ideas from expressions when comparing two paintings or
other visual art works. Similarly, this test does easily translate to
complex, technical subject matter as may be found in computer
or music cases.
Additionally, it is should be noted that even though the Ninth
Circuit purports to break the issue up into an objective and
subjective analysis, in reality, it is possible that judges even in
the Ninth Circuit continue to make subjective decisions on
summary judgment, and thus on a portion of the test that is
supposed to be purely objective. For instance, if on summary
judgment the judge is determining whether extrinsic similarities
exist between the two works, the obvious question becomes:
how many similarities have to be present to send it to the jury?
The jurisprudence in the Ninth Circuit does not provide a bright
line rule to answer this question. Thus, a judge looking at two
works will at some level be making a subjective determination
of how many extrinsic similarities are too many. Would one
similarity be enough? Two? Ten? Where does a judge draw the
line? This flaw presents a major difficulty for courts and has the
potential to produce unreliable and unpredictable precedent.
D. Circuits That Follow the Ninth Circuit’s
Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test
1. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit uses a version of the Ninth Circuit’s
extrinsic/intrinsic test to compare works. 135 In Towler v. Sayles,
134

Id.
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.2, at 3-29; see also
Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 801 (4th Cir.
2001); Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 583 (4th Cir. 1996); Dawson v.
135
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the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that
defendant’s screenplay was not substantially similar to plaintiff’s
copyrighted screenplay. 136 The court articulated that proving
substantial similarity requires a two part analysis. 137 On the
extrinsic portion of the Fourth Circuit’s test, “a plaintiff must
show—typically with the aid of expert testimony—that the works
in question are extrinsically similar because they contain
substantially similar ideas that are subject to copyright
protection.” 138 The court analyzed the similarities in plot,
theme, mood, dialogue, setting, and pace between the two
screenplays and determined that the works were not extrinsically
similar because the only extrinsic similarity was that they both
had a black female character and white female charter who were
friends. 139
To satisfy the intrinsic portion of the Fourth Circuit’s test, a
plaintiff must “[show] substantial similarity in how those ideas
are expressed” by considering whether the intended audience
would consider the works substantially similar. 140 Expert
testimony is usually not permissible on the intrinsic portion
which compares the “total concept and feel” of the two works
and considers “whether the intended audience could determine
that the works are substantially similar.”141 In Towler, the court
determined that the intended audience was the movie-going
public and that the works were not intrinsically similar because
the total concept and feel of the two works was completely

Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 732-33 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 981 (1990); Eaton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 972 F.Supp. 1019 (E.D.
Va. 1997), aff’d, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10288 (4th Cir. May 21, 1998).
136
76 F.3d at 583.
137
Id. at 583-84.
138
Id. (For example, in comparing two screenplays, a court “must
analyze both screenplays and the record, searching for extrinsic similarities
such as those found in plot, theme, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, or
sequence.”).
139
Id. at 584.
140
Id. at 583-84.
141
Id. at 584.

NICOLE.DOC

1404

7/1/2007 11:28 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

different. 142
The major difference between the Ninth Circuit and the
Fourth Circuit tests is that the Fourth Circuit utilizes the
“intended audience” test rather than an ordinary observer test to
determine whether the works are intrinsically similar.143 This
was demonstrated in Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., where the
Fourth Circuit held that
[I]f, as will most often be the case, the lay public
fairly represents the intended audience, the court
should apply the lay observer formulation . . . .
However, if the intended audience is more narrow in
that it possesses specialized expertise, relevant to the
purchasing decision, that lay people would lack, the
court’s inquiry should focus on whether a member of
the intended audience would find that two works to
be substantially similar. 144
The Fourth Circuit includes in this inquiry the “admission of
testimony from members of the intended audience, or, possibly,
from those who possess expertise with reference to the tastes
and perceptions of the intended audience.” 145
Two prominent copyright scholars, Robert C. Osterberg and
Eric C. Osterberg noted the following advantages and
disadvantages of the intended audience test:
The intended audience test offers the obvious
142

Towler v. Sayles, 76 F.3d 579, 584 (4th Cir. 1996)
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.2, at 3-30.
Osterberg and Osterberg noted that currently, “the Fourth Circuit’s intended
audience test is the minority approach. Other than . . . exceptions . . . with
respect to children’s works and computer programs, most courts seem to
require that works be compared by the ordinary observer, that is, jurors with
no specialized training or expertise, in all instances.” Id. at 3-36.
144
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 736 (4th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981.
145
Id. Nevertheless, the court in Dawson cautioned that “a court should
be hesitant to find that the lay public does not fairly represent a work’s
intended audience . . . departure from the lay characterization is warranted
only where the intended audience possesses ‘specialized expertise.’” Id. at
737.
143
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advantage of evaluation of the works through the eyes
of those who understand them best. On the other
hand, to apply the intended audience test, the court
must both identify the intended audience and either
select only members of that audience for its jury or
accept expert testimony concerning the intended
audience’s reaction, potentially yielding the factfinding function to the expert. 146
Thus, while the intended audience test attempts to address
the root purposes of copyright law it does not provide a suitable
framework that would be applicable to all cases where the issue
is whether two works are substantially similar. For example, this
test would be problematic where a work has many intended
audiences or if the intended audience could not be identified. 147
Additionally, as discussed later in this Note, providing
authors with the economic incentive to create work is not the
only factor that must be considered. One must consider the
alternative that an increase in the number of works that can be
protected causes a shrinking of the public domain which has the
potential to stifle creativity.148 If protection is afforded to a work
because the allegedly infringing work could have an effect on
the original author’s market, there is the potential that people
will be less inclined to building upon and use other’s works for
fear of being held liable. 149 This would be bad for society
because, potentially, less works would be created. 150
2. The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit also uses a version of the
extrinsic/intrinsic test of the Ninth Circuit. 151 The Eighth
146

OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.2, at 3-36.
See id.
148
See Mohler, supra note 8, at 974.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.3, at 3-37; see also
Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958 (8th Cir.
2005); Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 945 (8th Cir.
147
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Circuit’s test is described by the court in Hartman v. Hallmark
Cards, Inc. as follows: “First, similarity of ideas is analyzed
extrinsically, focusing on objective similarities in the details of
the works. Second, if there is substantial similarity in ideas,
similarity of expression is evaluated using an intrinsic test
depending on the response of the ordinary, reasonable person as
to the forms of expression.” 152 On the intrinsic portion of the
test, the question is whether the ordinary, reasonable observer
would find substantial similarity of expression. 153 Accordingly,
expert testimony is permitted only on the extrinsic portion of the
test, and may not be utilized for the intrinsic test. 154
In Hartman, the plaintiff asserted that defendants Hallmark
and Mattel used plaintiff’s graphics and script entitled “The
Adventures of Rainbow Island” as the basis for their “Rainbow
Brite” character and products. 155 The Eighth Circuit upheld the
district court’s grant of summary judgment which found, when it
analyzed the two works extrinsically and focused on the
objective similarities in the works, that the plaintiff’s work
consisted almost completely of uncopyrightable ideas or general
themes. 156 On the intrinsic portion of the test, the court
examined the district court’s comparison of the total concept and
feel of the two works and concluded that the two creations were
not substantially similar in expression. 157

1992); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987).
Both the Eighth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit, use a version of the Ninth
Circuit’s extrinsic/intrinsic test that comes from Ninth Circuit cases that were
decided in the years between Krofft and the re-articulated objective/subjective
test from Shaw. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.3, at 3-37.
152
Hartman, 833 F.2d at 120.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. at 119.
156
Id. at 121.
157
Id. at 120-21.
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E. The Remaining Circuits
The remaining circuits utilize a variety of tests to assess
substantial similarity. The Tenth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and the
D.C. Circuit, use the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, or a
version thereof. 158 The Eleventh Circuit primarily uses the
ordinary
observer
test,
but
occasionally
uses
the
extrinsic/intrinsic test. 159
1. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit uses the abstraction-filtration-comparison
test for various types of infringement cases, including computer
cases. 160 The Tenth Circuit, in Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc.
v. Sheen, applied the abstraction-filtration-comparison test to
determine whether allegedly infringing wooden dolls were
substantially similar to the protectible elements of the plaintiff’s
copyrighted dolls. 161
The court described the test as follows:
At the abstraction step, we separate the ideas (and
basic utilitarian functions) which are not protectible,
from the particular expression of the work. Then, we
filter out the nonprotectible components of the
product from the original expression. Finally, we
compare the remaining protected elements to the
allegedly copied work to determine if the two works

158

OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3, at 3-2; see also
Hartman, 833 F.2d at 120-21.
159
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3, at 3-2.
160
Id. at § 3:3.1, at 3-39; see also Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v.
Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 1996); Kindergartners Count, Inc. v.
DeMoulin, 249 F.Supp. 2d 1214 (D. Kan. 2003); Madrid Chronicle Books,
209 F.Supp. 2d 1227 (D.Wyo. 2002); Fisher v. United Feature Sydicate,
Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 1999), aff’d. 203 F.3d 834 (10th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 992 (2000).
161
77 F.3d at 1284.
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are substantially similar. 162
The court utilized this test to determine that the size, shape,
and medium of the plaintiff’s dolls were unprotectible elements
and thus must be filtered out. 163 Nevertheless, the court
remanded the case to the district court to conduct a comparison
analysis. 164 The court further articulated that the ordinary
observer test is the appropriate method for courts to use on the
comparison analysis. 165
Like both the extrinsic/intrinsic test and the ordinary
observer test, this test is problematic for many of the same
reasons. The process that this test requires is very similar to the
extrinsic/intrinsic test and the ordinary observer test that asks
courts to separate out ideas from expressions. 166 Similar to those
tests, this test does not provide much guidance on how to do so
and offers little direction to answer the ultimate question of
whether a work has been improperly appropriated.
2. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit, in Kohus v. Mariol, 167 recently adopted a
test for assessing substantial similarity that appears to be a
version of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test. 168 Previous
to Kohus, the Sixth Circuit had not adopted a specific test for
assessing substantial similarity in a copyright infringement
case. 169 Kohus involved the alleged infringement of plaintiff’s
162

Id. at 1284-85.
Id. at 1287.
164
Id. at 1288.
165
Id.
166
See id. at 1285.
167
328 F.3d 848 (6th Cir. 2003).
168
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:3.2, at 3-43.
169
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:3.2, at 3-42; see also
Kohus, 328 F.3d at 854 (6th Cir. 2003); Stromback v. New Line Cinema,
384 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2004); Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir.
1999) (court utilized the ordinary observer test without the aid of expert
testimony); Bird Brain, Inc. v. Menard, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11668
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 4, 2000) (utilizing the ordinary observer test in assessing
163
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copyrighted drawing of a portable children’s playyard latch by
defendant’s patent drawings for a collapsible playyard. 170
The court in Kohus, adopted a two part test. 171 In the first
step, courts are supposed to “filter out the unoriginal,
unprotectible elements—elements that were not independently
created by the inventor, and that possess no minimal degree of
creativity—through a variety of analyses.” 172 Expert testimony is
permissible on the first step. 173 Next, “[o]nce the unprotectible
elements have been filtered out, the second step is to determine
whether the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to
the protectible elements of the original.” 174 The court looked to
the Fourth Circuit case, Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., to
hold that “the inquiry in the second prong of the substantial
similarity test should focus on the intended audience.” 175
substantial similarity without the use of experts); Marigold Foods, Inc. v.
Purity Dairies, Inc., 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14044 (6th Cir. June 10, 1992)
(district court used the extrinsic/intrinsic test and the court of appeals used
the same test).
170
328 F.3d at 851-52.
171
Id. at 855.
172
Id. (citations omitted). “The court specifically identified ideas,
elements dictated by efficiency, and scenes a faire as elements to be filtered
out before comparing works. In a later case . . . the court added another item
to the list of elements to be filtered—independently-created elements.”
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:3.2, at 3-43 – 3-44.
173
See Kohus, 328 F.3d at 856 (The court stated that on the first step,
“[i]n the present case expert testimony will likely be required to establish
what elements, if any, are necessary to the function of any latch designed for
the upper arm of a collapsible playyard.”).
174
Id.
175
Id. at 856-57 (citing Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731,
736 (4th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original) (holding that [i]n cases where the
target audience possesses specialized expertise, however, the specialist’s
perception of similarity may be much different from the lay observer’s, and it
is appropriate in such cases to consider similarity from the specialist’s
perspective . . . . [T]he intended audience . . . will ordinarily be the lay
public, in which case the finder of fact’s judgment should be from the
perspective of the lay observer or . . . the ordinary reasonable person. But in
cases where the audience for the work possesses specialized expertise that is
relevant to the purchasing decision and lacking in the lay observer, the trier
of fact should make the substantial similarity determination from the
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The court remanded the case to permit expert testimony on
the first prong, because the drawings were “technical in nature
and a lay person is unlikely to understand what constitutes
creativity in this area, which elements are standard for the
industry, and which elements are dictated by efficiency or by
external standards.” 176 Additionally, the court directed that in
examining the second prong of the test, substantial similarity
should be analyzed from the viewpoint of the intended audience,
noting that in this case the intended audience may not be the lay
public, but rather trained engineers. 177
This test varies from the abstraction/filtration/comparison
test because it at least provides some guidance with regards to
from whose viewpoint the comparison should be done. Here, the
comparison is done from the intended audience’s viewpoint.
While this test clarifies that point, it does not solve any of the
previously articulated problems. Additionally, conducting the
comparison from the intended audience perspective has the
positives and negatives previously discussed (e.g. what happens
when the intended audiences are not the same?). 178
3. The District of Columbia Circuit
The District of Columbia Circuit uses the ordinary observer
test in some cases and the filtration/comparison inquiry in other
cases. 179 In cases where the defendant does not claim that the
plaintiff’s work is composed of non-copyrightable elements, the

perspective of the intended audience.).
176
Id. at 857-58.
177
Id. at 858.
178
See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:2.2, at 3-36; see
also Section III.D.1 of this Note.
179
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:3.3, at 3-46; see also
Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (utilizing the ordinary
observer test for assessing substantial similarity); Whitehead v. CBS/Viacom,
Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2004) (utilizing the ordinary observer
test); Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (utilizing a two-step filtration/comparison inquiry).
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D.C. Circuit applies the ordinary observer test. 180 But, in cases
where the defendant argues that plaintiff’s work contains
portions that are not protected by copyright, the D.C. Circuit
conducts a two-step filtration/comparison inquiry. 181 First, the
court identifies “which aspects of the artist’s work, if any are
protectible by copyright,” 182 filtering out “unprotectible
elements such as ideas and scenes a faire.” 183 Next, the court
uses the ordinary observer test to determine “whether the
allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to the
protectible elements of the artist’s work.” 184
4. The Eleventh Circuit
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit, primarily uses the ordinary
observer test to assess substantial similarity, but has occasionally
used the extrinsic/intrinsic test as well. 185 In Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co., the Eleventh Circuit held that in order to
show substantial similarity, plaintiff was required to show that
“an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as
having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.” 186
Suntrust Bank involved an attempt by owners of copyright in
the novel “Gone with the Wind” to obtain a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent the
180

See Atkins, 331 F.3d 988; Whitehead, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1.
See e.g., Sturdza, 281 F.3d at 1295.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 1296.
184
Id. (holding that in using the ordinary observer test the determination
“requires comparison not only of the two works’ individual elements in
isolation, but also of their overall look and feel.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
185
OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 3:4, at 3-48; see also
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co, 268 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir.
2001) (utilizing the ordinary observer test to assess substantial similarity);
Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000) (utilizing
the ordinary observer test to assess substantial similarity); Herzog v. Castle
Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1248 (11th Cir. 1999) (the Eleventh Circuit
utilized the extrinsic/intrinsic test of the Ninth Circuit).
186
268 F.3d at 1266.
181
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publication and distribution of the allegedly infringing book
“The Wind Done Gone.” After conducting a comparison of the
two works, the Court affirmed the district court’s finding that
the defendant copied much more of plaintiff’s work than just
unprotectible scenes-a-faire including the characters and their
complex relationships with each other, plot, fictional locales,
and settings. 187
In contrast, in Herzog v. Castle Rock, Entm’t the Eleventh
Circuit utilized a two-part test for establishing substantial
similarity. 188 The court articulated that the plaintiff must satisfy
both the extrinsic, or objective test and the intrinsic, or
subjective test. Herzog involved a claim by the plaintiff that
defendant’s motion picture entitled “Loan Star” infringed
plaintiff’s copyrighted screenplay entitled “Concealed.” 189 The
court conducted an analysis of the two works and held that the
similarities that existed between the two works consisted of
noncopyrightable elements and that no reasonable juror could
find that the two works were substantially similar in
expression. 190
IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT LAW
The attempts by courts to articulate and redefine tests in
hopes of eliminating confusion have in fact resulted in more
confusion and ambiguity about what the test for substantial
similarity should be. 191 Instead of trying to wade through the
confusing array of tests available or attempting to articulate a
single test, courts should articulate a standard that goes to the
ultimate purpose of copyright. In order to determine if there has
been copyright infringement a court should determine whether or
not providing relief for the owner of the copyright will enhance
the policy goals of copyright and the objectives of Congress.
187
188
189
190
191

Id. at 1266-67.
193 F.3d at 1257.
Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1262.
Mohler, supra note 8, at 990.
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The tests that have been discussed throughout this Note are
looking at the issue in the wrong way. The majority of circuit
courts discussed incorporate some form of ordinary observer test
into their substantial similarity formula. Making the important
decision of substantial similarity based on the perception of the
ordinary observer is looking at the issue from not only an
unclear and ambiguous perspective, but is also misguided.
Rather, courts should be considering the issue in order to
determine how much copying is too much based on the policy
and aims of the Copyright statute.
In Mazer v. Stein, the Supreme Court stated that
[t]he economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights
is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in “Science and the useful Arts.” Sacrificial
days devoted to such creative activities deserve
rewards commensurate with the services rendered. 192
The main problem with this theory is that it does not adequately
address the potential effect that looking at the issue from an
economic perspective would have on creativity. The opposite
side to this economic perspective is the notion that granting an
author a monopoly for a period also prevents people from
expanding and creating new works based on old works. 193 Thus,
findings of infringement should be limited in an effort to
promote the production of creative works and to promote a
robust public domain.
Many legal scholars have weighed in on the various tests for
assessing substantial similarity in a copyright infringement action
and have attempted to bring clarity to this confusing and
unpredictable area of the law by articulating new tests and ways
to view copyright infringement cases. 194
192
193

347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)
See Busek, supra note 10, at 1777-78; see also Mohler, supra note 8,

at 974.
194

Stanfield, supra note 4, at 510-11.
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Michael Sharb suggested a redefined total concept and feel
test that consisted of five steps. 195 Sharb’s redefined test
proposed an adoption of the total concept and feel test as “the
uniform test of substantial similarity of expression” and “the
intended audience test as the uniform test of perspective in the
total concept and feel inquiry.”196
The argument against Sharb’s redefined test is that it “relies
upon other tests to determine the line between idea and
expression, and the ordinary observer test to assess whether
similarity is substantial.” 197 Thus, the same problems articulated
above that arise with the idea/expression dichotomy and the
ordinary observer test, especially when it comes to technical and
complex works will inevitably be problematic in this redefined
test.
Jarrod Mohler suggested that one “over-arching and flexible
test” does not exist. 198 He concluded that “the ‘abstractions’
framework from Nichols v. Universal Picture Corp. is sufficient
to assist the trier of fact, and that the use of other tests for
substantial similarity is unnecessary and positively harmful.”199
Mohler suggests that the use of these other tests is harmful
because they are often inconsistently and misapplied, thus
leading to a great amount of confusion for courts and

195

Michael L. Sharb, Comment, Getting a “Total Concept and Feel” of
Copyright Infringement, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 903, 929 (1993). The five part
test requires:
1) does the plaintiff have a valid copyright? 2) did the defendant
copy from the plaintiff? 3) is what the defendant copied from the
plaintiff an unprotectible idea or protectible expression? 4) if
expression was copied, does it constitute improper
appropriation, or, in other words, are the works substantially
similar (the original source of the [total concept and feel] test)
and 5) from whose perspective should the substantial similarity
inquiry be made.
Id. at 920.
196
Id. at 923.
197
Stanfield, supra note 4, at 510.
198
Mohler, supra note 8, at 989.
199
Id. at 972, citing 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
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commentators. 200 While it is apparent that one single test does
not exist, the ‘abstractions’ framework that requires line drawing
between ideas and expressions still provides little guidance and
is problematic for courts. 201
Jeannette Rene Busek addressed the difficulties that courts
have in applying the current tests to a variety of works when she
suggested that courts should “consider the type of work in
question, using it as a base for the standard of substantial
similarity.” 202 Busek argued that
[i]nstead of trying to fit all copyright infringement
cases into neat tests that are independent of the
amount of expressive variation possible, courts would
be better off recognizing the vast differences between
the types of works covered by copyright law and
articulating their decisions based on the amount of
expressive variation available to the particular type of
work. 203
This approach addresses the problems associated with the
current tests in dealing with a variety of types of works. The
difficulty with this proposal is that it also requires courts to
make difficult determinations between what constitutes an idea
and what constitutes an expression of an idea. Courts are asked
to determine whether in a particular type of work there are
many expressive variations. This seems similar to how a court
would be required to distinguish between ideas and expressions
under the abstractions test analysis.
A few commentators and courts have suggested a test or
approach that looks at the market for which the original work
was intended. For example, Edward Wilde proposed that courts
replace the idea/expression dichotomy with a market-based
analysis. 204 Wilde argued that the idea/expression terminology
200

Mohler, supra note 8, at 971.
COHEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 80.
202
Busek, supra note 10, at 1778.
203
Id. at 1803.
204
Edward C. Wilde, Replacing the Idea/Expression Metaphor with a
Market-Based Analysis in Copyright Infringement Actions, 16 WHITTIER L.
201
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traditionally used by courts “does not work well and it does not
address the root purpose of copyright law.” 205 Instead, Wilde
suggested that the courts should analyze the market for each
work and “determine whether the copied similarities in the
second work are such that the second work can substitute for the
first work or otherwise usurp the proper market position of the
first work. If the two works will compete as separate products,
then there is no wrongful infringement.” 206
Additionally, Michael Der Manuelian in criticizing the
ordinary observer test, articulated that “[i]f, as Arnstein
suggested, copyright law should protect the plaintiff’s interest in
potential financial returns, the ultimate test for infringement
should consider specifically the response of the market from
which those returns would derive.” 207 Similarly, Professor
Nimmer has argued that copyright is intended “to protect writers
from the theft of the fruits of their labor, not to protect against
the general public’s “spontaneous and immediate” impression
that the fruits have been stolen.” 208 In his criticism of the
ordinary observer or average lay hearer test, Der Manuelian
continued: “an average lay hearer may not be qualified to
determine the responses of the particular audience for whom the
music has been composed . . . . Finally, the ‘lay-hearer test’
may promote findings of infringement based on overall
similarities which, in fact, may be attributable, not to copying,
but to common sources or genuine coincidence.” 209
While a market based analysis is less confusing than the tests
currently available and attempts to address the underlying
purpose of copyright law, courts must be conscious of the
shrinking public domain and the effect that this has on the
proliferation of new creations. 210 The Framers of the
REV. 793 (1995).
205
Id. at 794.
206
Id. at 841.
207
Der Manuelian, supra note 70, at 144-45 (citing Arnstein v. Porter,
154 F.2d 464, 486 (2d Cir. 1946).
208
Nimmer at § 13.03[E], at 13-49.
209
Der Manuelian, supra note 70, at 144-45 (internal citations omitted).
210
Mohler, supra note 8, at 974.
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Constitution authorized the creation of Federal Copyright Law in
order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” 211
Thus, the purpose of copyright law is to promote, not restrain,
creativity in the arts.
It is clearly the case that courts have expanded the scope of
the protection of the reproduction right. 212 Authors increasingly
get the right to prevent people from copying their works in more
and more ways. 213
In recent years . . . an increasing number of trivial
copyright violations have made it to court . . . . This
increase in litigation of trivial copyright violations is
problematic . . . [because] strict enforcement of
copyright for trivial violations rarely furthers, and
often contravenes, the purpose of copyright:
promotion of creativity . . . [and] courts have not
taken a consistent approach to adjudicating trivial
violations: a few hold that liability extends even to
the most innocuous violations, while most find a way
to privilege trivial violations using one of several
doctrinal tools. Unfortunately, these tools, most
notably . . . substantial similarity, [have] at times
been stretched beyond recognition to achieve the
courts’ desired results. 214
It is important to consider whether as copyright protection
gets more and more protective, there is the potential to stifle
creativity.
After conducting an examination of the myriad of confusing
tests and recommendations for new tests, this Note asks the
question: Do we really need a test at all?
Ultimately, courts should not employ any of the articulated
tests and instead should engage in a weighing of the goals of
copyright to determine whether a finding of infringement would
211

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Andrew Inesi, Article, A Theory of De Minimus and a Proposal for
its Application in Copyright, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945, 946 (2006).
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“strike the optimal balance between providing authors with
incentives to create and encouraging dissemination of works and
information to the public.” 215 In order to achieve this goal,
courts must ultimately attempt “to balance the needs of existing
authors for protection with needs of future authors to use the
ideas and other raw materials need to create.” 216
CONCLUSION
Due to the present state of uncertainty and confusion
surrounding substantial similarity in a copyright infringement
action, we are moving further and further away from a uniform
copyright law. The Supreme Court needs to articulate a standard
that would resolve this split in the circuits.
The conflict within the Circuits has lasted for many years
and does not seem to show any signs of diminishing. The
outcome of many copyright infringement cases comes down to
whether or not two works are substantially similar. Under the
current state of affairs, there is a great chance that litigants will
forum shop for a Circuit that is friendly to plaintiffs in copyright
infringement suits. There should be a single uniform standard
articulated by the Supreme Court because copyright is a federal
law. Thus, it is critical that the Supreme Court resolve this issue
so that the outcome of each case dealing with substantial
similarity under the Federal Copyright Act does not come down
to where the case was filed.
This Note argues that when courts analyze substantial
similarity, they are looking at the issue in the wrong way. When
making the determination of whether someone ought to be able
to bring a copyright infringement claim, it is necessary to look
at why the Constitution affords copyright protection. Currently,
the tests do not adequately look at impact on creativity of
industry. It is important to remember that “the purpose of
copyright is to create incentives for creative effort” 217 Instead of
215
216
217
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focusing on the impact of creativity, court focus more on the
potential harm to the plaintiff’s market, without considering need
for the incentive. Courts should abandon the current tests and
make their determinations of copyright infringement based on
whether or not providing relief for the owner of the copyright
will enhance the objectives that congress had in mind when they
created a federal copyright law. Under such as approach, while
the outcome of a particular case may be less predictable,
litigants will be able to focus on the merits of the case rather
than advocating for a particular test to be applied to the merits.
Courts and advocates will no longer have to deliberate over
ambiguous terms such as ordinary lay observer, intended
audience, and extrinsic or intrinsic. 218

450 (1984).
218
Sharb, supra note 195, at 929.

